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LETTER FROM AN AUTHOR

Mr. Terrell has raised a number of criticisms in his review of our book,
Poverty in America (with Ralph Segalman, not Seligman, as he erroneously writes
six times) that require comment. He believes the book is "mean-spirited,
sloppy, and pedantic...[and] is carelessly constructed, repetitive, and dated."
Moreover, "the authors ignore facts and analyses that do not conform to their
thesis" and "complexity and multiple explanations are not the authors' strong
I seriously disagree with these characterizations and maintain that
points."
a more careful reading of the book does not support these accusations. For
brevity's sake, I will not undertake a point-by-point rebuttal, but confront
the testier elements of his argument.
First, Mr. Terrell simply misses 'the point of our argument when he writes
we "argue by accretion." The first ten pages of the book state, criticize, and
synthesize alternative and competing perspectives of poverty. On page 7, for
example, we note the inadequacies of the culture of poverty and situational
perspectives.
Second, in the first chapter we never stated that our typology of marginal,
transitional, and residual poor would capture the "human diversity" of a poverty
community as an ethnographic study would. Our typology is an abstraction constructed from a multitude of ethnographic studies of the poor. Since our study
does not purport to be ethnographic, Mr. Terrell has erected a very weak strawman to knock down.
Third, Mr. Terrell overlooks the role the typology plays in our argument.
We argue that the poor are not a homogeneous mass, that there are many causes
of poverty (cultural and structural), that helping the poor move into the
mainstream of American society requires that poverty programs be tailored to
meet the specific needs of the poverty population the programs are intended to
help, and that such programs are related to the country's overall economic
needs.
Fourth, we do not rely "principally on the culture-of-poverty literature
We reserve the culture-of-poverty explanation (with structural
of the 1960s."
modifications) for the residual poor who are at risk of becoming America's
transgenerational poor; but we are not monists. In Chapter One, we clearly
"The American black, the American Indian, and other minority
state (p. 14):
groups, however, have often been held back by conditions and forces that have
prevented meaningful access to many of the facilities readily offered the
immigrants. These include effective education, consistent and fair wages,
opportunities for upward economic mobility, and housing relatively free from
restrictions."
Fifth, we do not argue against public intervention. In the postscript
(p. 369), we argue "a multistep pattern of assistance and services needs to be
Services and
formulated for welfare, housing, education, and employment.
constraints should be commensurate with the readiness of that segment of the
population to utilize both to their own and society's advantage." Given our
four complex and interrelated problems, it is difficult to see how Mr. Terrell
concludes that "complexity and multiple explanations are not the atuhors'
strong points." Parenthetically, the cost-effectiveness of continuing the
Great Society programs as they are presently constituted is open to criticism;
however, space precludes me from challenging Mr. Terrell on this point.
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Sixth, the use of the term "Negro" occurs in Chapter Two, which compares
the assimilation experiences of early immigrants, refugee immigrants, and the
"American Negro slave."
Elsewhere in that historical chapter the term "Negro"
and "black" are often used interchangeably, but "black" is the modal usage.
The main objection we have to Mr. Terrell's comment is that we do not believe
the use of the term "Negro" to be racist, nor is it an attempt to turn back
the historical clock.
Finally, we believe Poverty in America provides the student of welfare
with an historical overview of poverty in America, relevant contemporary
data, and an analysis of all the major proposals for welfare reform. Since
welfare reform has not been enacted under Presidents Carter and Reagan, the
book is hardly "dated." Lastly, Mr. Terrell failed to cite one major study
published prior to 1979 which we ignored. Mr. Terrell should either substantiate his claim with evidence or withdraw this reckless charge.
This comment does not answer all the criticisms raised by Mr. Terrell.
I have, however, refuted his more explicitly formulated criticisms and submit
that a more careful and thoughtful reading of Poverty in America provides no
evidence to support his characterization of our work. Let the reader judge.

Asoke Basu
Visiting Scholar
Hoover Institution
Stanford
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THE LIMITS OF REFORM: WOMEN, CAPITAL AND WELFARE, by JENNIFER G. SCHIRMER.
Cambridge, Mass.: Schenkman Publishing Co., 1982. 200 pp. $14.50 paper.

KRISTINE NELSON
The University of Iowa

The Limits of Reform is an important book, especially for those who harbor
illusions about the liberal state's ability and willingness to bestow full
equality on women. In her book, Jennifer Schirmer exposes the sexist truth
behind the liberal rhetoric of the Danish welfare state. She argues that the
"structure of the labor market, the bureaucratic control of the corporate
state, and the traditional view of gender" (p. 43) combine to maintain women's
inequality.
Specifically, the state depoliticizes and limits social conflict
through social reform while protecting the interests of capital and intruding
on everyday life and the family in a process Schirmer calls "incorporatism"
(pp. 33-34).
Schirmer starts with a useful historical overview of the Danish welfare
state and economy. The early development of capitalism, the influx of women
into the labor force in the 1960s and 1970s, and the retrenchment in social
spending in the 1970s and 1930s closely parallel developments in the United
States. Schirmer's devastating critique of the Social Democratic party's
response to these developments demonstrates that, however advanced the Danish
efforts to mitigate the inequality of capitalism through social welfare and
educational reforms, they rest on the false assumption that equal opportunity
can create real equality. "The economic inequities of the capitalist system
and the very social reforms that were enacted to improve the position of
women impede them both as a gender and as members of class groups from attaining real equality" (p. 168).
Specifically these social reforms attract women
into a low paying, unstable secondary labor market while maintaining their
position as flexible, marginal workers by reinforcing their traditional
responsibilities for home and family. Women's participation in the labor
market, Schirmer asserts, should not be seen as a "willingness" to combine
work and family, but as a response to economic and political forces which draw
them into low paying service jobs such as day care, home help for the elderly,
and nurses aides (p. 62).
Although, formally, equal pay for equal work has been the law in Denmark
since 1976, Schirmer shows that through job reclassification, impediments to
training and, most importantly, manipulation of women's family roles and
loyalties, women remain at the bottom of the occupational hierarchy. She also
exposes the inherent dishonesty of meritocracy when applied to persons unable
to attain the basic conditions for competitiveness. Even liberal, well-educated professional women are shown to be handicapped by their heavy burden of
family responsibilities and by employers' preference for hiring and promoting
male workers.
The much-admired services of the welfare state such as government-supported
day care and extended paid maternity leave are also shown in practice to limit
women's choices by their inflexibility and inadequacy and by employers' flagrant
discrimination against women who are pregnant, mothers, or even of child-bearing

age. Catch-22 situations in which unemployed women cannot keep their children
in day care, yet cannot take a new job without day care (p. 135) show the
ineptness of the system. "Man in the house" rules which require the sexual
isolation of women receiving public assistance (p. 145) show its patriarchal
bias.
This book was written to alert women to the danger of seeing the Danish
welfare state as "a model for improving women's position" (p. 171) and to the
error in relying on any state which is itself enmeshed in patriarchal and
capitalist imperatives. To the extent that the evidence Schirmer presents is
persuasive, the book succeeds in this mission. The many statistics and quotations, however, sometimes are tedious and make no clear point. A judicious
editing of the manuscript would have produced a book which was easier to read,
free of annoying stylistic inconsistencies, and which better integrated theory
with fact and fact with conclusion.
MARXISM AND DOMINATION: A NEO-HEGELIAN, FEMINIST, PSYCHOANALYTIC THEORY OF
SEXUAL, POLITICAL, AND TECHNOLOGICAL LIBERATION, by ISAAC D. BALBUS.
Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1982. 471 pp. $40.00 cloth.
$9.95 paper.

DAN LA BOTZ
Chicago

Isaac Balbus examines the "crisis in Western Marxism" and attempts to
point the way out of it both theoretically and practically in his new book
Marxism and Domination. Criticizing both Marxist and neo-Marxist theories of
the state, patriarchy, and technology, he finds them flawed and inadequate,
and argues instead for a liberation theory "beyond Marxism" based on participatory democracy, ecology and feminism, especially on Dorothy Dinnerstein's
analysis of "mother-monopolized child rearing" as the root cause of the
problems of Western civilization.
Balbus rejects both the Marxist model, with its emphasis on production,
the political power of the state, and the role of the proletariat as the
emancipator of humanity, and the eclectic neo-Marxist models which grafted
contemporary feminist and ecological theories on to Marxism, as "instrumental
modes of symbolization" which, like capitalism, perpetuate a "death-denying,
mother defying unconscious psychic structure" (p. 334) which embodies a "biosocial and cultural imperialism" (p. 278).
Balbus argues for an analysis based
on his extensions of the psychological theories of Dinnerstein and Nancy
Chodorow, Hegel's philosophy of the Absolute Idea, Anthony Wilden's dialectic
of general systems theory, and the writings of Norman 0. Brown on death, all
permeated with anarchist theory.
In a final chapter that draws the political conclusions of this analysis,
he argues that even a revolutionary socialist labor movement is not necessarily liberating and may well be reactionary, and calls for a feminist-ecological-participatory-democratic movement. Unfortunately, while Balbus would like
to resolve the crisis of Western Marxism, his book strikes one as only another
expression of it, a former Marxist scholar reverting to an anti-humanist,

reactionary Romanticism with quasi-religious overtones. His political program
raises the dangerous possibility of dividing the labor movement from the feminist movement, and of separating both from those who fight for democratic
socialism--in fact, he becomes the advocate of a petty-bourgeois politics of
19th century anarchism.
Balbus's critique of Marxist philosophy, theories of patriarchy, and
technology is well informed and interesting and must be taken seriously--even
though this reviewer finds explanatory and even compelling theories which
Balbus finds inadequate and ultimately misleading. His critique of the
Marxist theory of the state is, on the contrary, incomplete and ahistorical,
based almost solely on one famous line from the Communist Manifesto. One
wonders why he ignores the historical writings of Marx and Engels, particularly
those on Bonaparte and Bismarck (or why he didn't make use of Hal Draper's
already classic work Karl Marx's Theory of Revolution:
Part I State and
Bureaucracy).
It is unfortunate, too, that he chose to mix Marx with (nominally)
Marxist fashionable writers like Louis Althusser or Nicos Poulantzas, while
ignoring the more important writings on the state of Marxists such as Lenin,
Trotsky, or Gramsci.
Without going into his critiques of the neo-Marxists, suffice it to say
that he finds them either eclectic or subject to the same critical charges he
makes against Marx. Against both Marxist and neo-Marxist views of the primacy
of production and the centrality of the state he argues, in short, that the
premises are either too narrow or are tautological. Balbus finds inherently
reactionary characteristics in modern industrial technology as such, which
Marxism cannot explain. And he uses familiar contemporary feminist arguments
to criticize Marx's inadequate explanation of patriarchy.
The heart of Balbus's critique is his view that Marxism and neo-Marxism
are, like capitalism which they criticize, "instrumental modes of symbolization."
He argues that a theory and practice based on industry, politics, and working
class struggle come to use nature, to use women, and to use political power as
means to an end. Ultimately, people are using people and nature as means not
ends, and thus would undo the very ends that even the best of them seek to
achieve.
Such critiques have been made in the past, usually by Kantian Marxists
like the Austrian Max Adler. Balbus's critique, however, derives from Hegel's
criticism of the Enlightenment in the Phenomenology of Mind. Balbus will
derive a "post-instrumental mode of symbolization" from Hegel's Absolute Idea
(i.e., God), and from a recognition that there are intentions and intelligences
other than human ones. Notwithstanding his denials, the quasi-religious
implications are unavoidable. So while Hegel can conceive the "purposefulness
or 'freedom' of [a] stone," likewise Balbus can refer to "the homeostatic
capacities of natural ecosystems which can be described as a form of 'intelligence'..... " (pp. 285 and 365).
He argues that "Totalitarian or technocratic politics is the corollary of
a totalitarian stance toward nature..." (p. 283), which derives from childrearing by women: "The domination of nature is the domination of the mother:
the symbolization of nature as an absolute, dangerous other which must be
tamed lest it destroy us is rooted in the unconscious, childhood symbolization
of the mother as an other who must be punished for having betrayed our love"
(p. 336).
Consequently the answer:
"Shared parenting thus establishes the

-544-

necessary psychological bases for... the post-Instrumental mode of symbolization"
(p. 339).
The answer is feminism, partly because, "Contemporary women...have an
unconscious emotional structure that is, in certain respects, far closer to
that of both primitive women and men than is the structure of contemporary
men" (p. 341).
In other places Balbus calls this structure emotional and
relational. All of this is part of a valorization of the primitive and
irrational which goes hand in hand with the quasi-religious view of nature and
which must he repugnant to any humanistic outlook, and certainly to a Marxist
socialist view.
His feminism is riddled with problems. How reconcile the fight for contraception and abortion with nature? How reconcile lesbian rights to raise
children with a view that "mother-monopolized childrearing" is the origin of
all our problems? How explain Golda Meier, Indira Gandhi, Eva Peron, and
Margaret Thatcher if "...support for (almost always male) political despotism
continues that repudiation of the mother that began with the embrace of the
despotism of the father" (p. 323)?
Most important, however, are the political conclusions--the social
movements against labor. "Women's restaurants [run by participatory democracy]
typically offer vegetarian fare that has been 'naturally' prepared, i.e. cooked
without additives, refined sugar etc." (p. 368).
It is the old Proudhonian
mutualist cooperative in new feminist garb. A political movement built on
such a basis will be crushed by the weight of capital unless allied with the
labor movement. However, Balbus argues that, "The proletariat, as Marxists
and neo-Marxists define it, cannot be understood as the or even a revolutionary
agent within contemporary societies..." (p. 353), so the movements should eschew
alliances with it. Balbus would condemn the most progressive movements to
defeat by taking away their most powerful explanatory theory--Marxism--and
their potentially best ally--labor.
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